

~~SECRET~~

CD/ED
G

OCI NO. 4085
COPY NO. 10

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
21 April 1954

PRE-GENEVA CONFERENCE DEVELOPMENTS - XI

Soviet representative demands equal status for China in preparatory talks at Geneva: At an 18 April meeting of the representatives of the four sponsoring powers with a United Nations official in Geneva concerning administrative arrangements, the Soviet liaison officer, Pastoev, repeatedly insisted that the Chinese Communists should have exactly the same status and treatment on every item as the United States, Britain and France. He asserted that there are five inviting powers and that this will be a conference of five powers. When asked whether it was his opinion that there will be only five delegations, Pastoev replied, "I don't know, but we should proceed from the assumption that there are five delegations and not nineteen." He opposed the seating arrangements proposed by the Western representatives because they assumed that there will be nineteen equal powers.

Pastoev's adamant position is entirely consistent with earlier Soviet statements regarding the nature and composition of the conference. The Soviet note of 5 April on administrative arrangements, for example, denied that the conference will not be a "Big Five" meeting and asserted that the fact that only the five powers "will participate on both the Korean and Indochina questions" proves that Peiping will take part "on an equal basis with the other great powers."

Soviet official suggests partition of Indochina: A member of the Soviet UN delegation in a conversation with an American official on 15 April suggested "on a personal basis" the possibility of a compromise settlement in Indochina similar to the Korean armistice, under which fighting would cease and each side would retain possession of the areas it now holds. This is the most specific Communist suggestion to date on cease-fire terms, although Soviet diplomats have twice previously suggested that partition would meet China's security needs and that the Korean precedent might be followed in Indochina.

The Soviet delegate also said the Chinese were sincere in their desire to have a period of peace and were prepared to "accept a compromise," but that just as in Korea when McArthur

State Dept. review completed

SEE REVERSE FOR DECLASSIFICATION ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Document No.	11
No Change in Class.	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Declassified	
Class. Changed To:	TS S C
Auth.:	HR 70-2
Date:	27 July 78

25X1

~~SECRET~~

approached the Yalu River, they "could not be blind" to the threat of French and now American action. This hint of possible Chinese counteraction is much less threatening than statements by the Chinese Communists prior to their intervention in Korea, but it is somewhat stronger than the cautious Soviet and Chinese press statements that United Nations intervention in Indochina would end in "defeat for the aggressors."

South Korea accepts invitation to Korea: President Rhee has agreed with "misgivings" to send a delegation to Geneva and stated that Foreign Minister Pyun will do his best to cooperate with the US. He informed Ambassador Briggs that President Eisenhower's letter made a "happy Easter" in South Korea. He was especially elated over the President's promise to assign General Van Fleet to make military recommendations on South Korea. Rhee has high respect for Van Fleet because of his excellent work in building up the army in 1952.

ILLEGIB



~~SECRET~~